IneqPer Working Paper Series

ISSN 3103-6279

Working Paper No. 2026-08, September 2026

How Learning about Poverty Affects Support for Redistribution in Italy

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Suggested citation: Griaznova, Olga; Bellani, Daniela; Kulic, Nevena; Scervini, Francesco (2026), *How Learning about Poverty Affects Support for Redistribution in Italy,* IneqPer Working Paper Series, No. 2026-08.

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.22685179

IneqPer Working Paper Series: www.ineqper.unipv.it

Editore:
Università degli Studi di Pavia – Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche e Sociali
Corso Strada Nuova, 65
27100 – Pavia (Italy)

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Abstract

This paper presents evidence from a large-scale randomized survey experiment (N = 2,000) conducted in Italy in 2024 to examine whether providing individuals with objective information about their economic position, measured as the distance between their household income and the poverty line, influences their preferences for redistribution. We consider four dimensions of redistributive preferences: government responsibility for reducing income inequality, perceptions of inequality as a fair reward for talent and effort, support for progressive taxation, and support for government anti-poverty measures. Building on rational learning theory, we hypothesize that individuals who learn that their household income is closer to the poverty line than they previously believed will express stronger support for redistribution than those in the control group, whereas those who learn that their income is further from the poverty line than they believed will express weaker support. The results show that corrective information affects redistributive preferences in a nuanced way. Support for progressive taxation is responsive to the information treatment, whereas broader normative attitudes toward inequality and support for government anti-poverty policies remain largely unchanged.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Preferences for redistribution have been a focal point in interdisciplinary research for decades, as they critically influence individuals' actions, economic and political behaviours (Rueda and

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[2] This work was funded by the European Union – Next Generation EU and the Italian Ministry of University and Research (MUR) through the project "Inequality between Reality and Perception: Socio-economic Status, Gender and Immigration in Italy (IneqPer)" (PRIN 2022 PNRR, grant no. P2022TWZN3, CUP F53D23011110001).

Stegmueller 2016). These implications play the central role for social cohesion, legitimacy of welfare state and policies aimed at reducing economic inequalities.

Considerable effort has been devoted to understanding why some people have high expectations about the role of the state in redistribution and social support, while others, on the contrary, believe that the state should not interfere with the self-governing laws of the market. This question is particularly relevant in contemporary societies characterized by growing economic inequality (Piketty 2017; Atkinson 2015), increasing political polarization (Busemeyer et al. 2023; Kriesi 2020; Boxell et al. 2024; Ferreira da Silva and Garzia 2024), and declining trust in institutions (Dalton and Welzel 2014; Rothstein 2005). At the same time, recent findings suggest that these preferences are remarkably static, even in the face of rising income inequality. As Ciani et al. (2021) note, data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) show that the share of respondents agreeing with the statement "It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes" has remained relatively stable since the late 1980s (Ciani et al. 2021, 8).

Existing research suggests that preferences for redistribution are shaped by a multiple interaction of different factors: economic conditions, political ideologies, cultural norms, and personal experiences (Alesina and Giuliano 2011). Within this literature, self-interest occupies a particularly prominent role. The main proposition of rationalists approaches is that individuals evaluate redistributive policies according to their self-interest, costs and benefits, adjusting their preferences in line with their income position, economic vulnerability and income satisfaction (Shin 2018; Meltzer and Richard 1981; Iversen and Soskice 2001).

Importantly, self-interest can derive from both objective and perceived economic standing. While objective self-interest refers to objective economic conditions of each individual (e.g. actual individuals' income ranking, income, wealth), perceived self-interest, by contrast, concerns subjective evaluations of their economic positions and vulnerability. A growing body of research shows that individuals frequently misperceive their position in income distribution and that these perceptions may matter even more for preferences for redistribution than objective conditions (Cruces et al. 2013; Engelhardt and Wagener 2018; Hoy and Mager 2021).

While insightful, literature based on observational data often fails to disentangle the causal mechanisms linking both objective conditions and subjective perceptions to preferences for redistribution. As a result, evidence on whether and how preferences for redistribution are shaped by individuals' objective economic circumstances, perceptions and rational evaluation of self-interest often remains inconclusive. Recent advances in survey and laboratory experiments made

it possible to causally test how individuals respond when they receive new information about their economic position, and whether they adjust their preferences for redistribution accordingly (Cruces et al. 2013; Kuziemko et al. 2015).

We report evidence from an original randomised survey experiment (n=2000) conducted in Italy in 2024, in which respondents received personalised information about their household income relative to the poverty threshold. Our study contributes to previous research in two important ways. First, rather than focusing on relative rank within the income distribution, we examine perceptions of proximity to the poverty line. We examine whether, and how, individuals adjust their preferences for redistribution in response to information about their poverty status. More specifically, we investigate whether providing information on the distance between their household income and the poverty line as a more salient benchmark for self-interest, influences their redistributive preferences. Unlike relative position on income scale, relative poverty is defined as falling below a previously predetermined threshold that reflects inability to live according to the acceptable living (Eurostat 2013). Second, the experiment allows us to test whether corrective information about poverty status alters preferences for redistribution by changing perceptions of self-interest. By providing individuals with explicit feedback on whether they are positioned above or below an officially defined poverty threshold, the intervention is designed not only to update objective information, but also to shape individuals' perceptions of their own economic vulnerability and potential exposure to redistributive policies.

This research contributes to the ongoing debate on the rationality of individuals in shaping their attitudes towards redistribution by using a more rigorous test of self-interest then previous studies. Our study examines whether people change their support for redistribution when they learn if they are above or below the poverty line. This helps us understand how being close to poverty shapes support for redistribution.

Italy is rarely examined as an empirical context in this literature even if it represents a particularly relevant case in the study of preferences for redistribution, and only a limited number of studies focus explicitly on the country. Although Italy is characterized by substantial redistribution through taxes and transfers, much of this redistribution is concentrated in pension spending, while redistributive protection for low-income working-age households has historically remained relatively weak, fragmented and less effective (Causa and Nørlem Hermansen 2018; Ferrera 1996). Ferrera argues that Italian welfare model belongs to the Southern European welfare regime characterised by contributory social insurance and fragmented welfare provision (Bambra 2007; Ferrera 1996; Bonoli 1997). Recently, in 2019, Italy introduced a means-tested income support scheme for targeted segments of low-income households (Baldini and Gori 2019; Granaglia 2019).

The introduction of the measure was a result of parties converging on the need to tackle poverty issue, although recent years see a political reversal (Mulè and Toso 2025). In this context, gaining a better understanding of the role of self-interest in shaping redistributive preferences is particularly important. Among the most recent contributions on Italy, Bruni et al. (2025) employed a survey experiment to examine how information about the native–immigrant composition of the poor affects preferences for redistribution. Buzzelli and Sacchi (2024), using a conjoint survey experiment, show that individuals who are exposed to real or perceived economic vulnerability (unemployment, precarious conditions, perceived low income) express more support for generous unemployment protection and less support for strict work conditionality. Another research on Italy relies on the 2009 L'Aquila earthquake as a natural experiment to test whether exposure to exogenous economic shocks affects preferences for redistribution (Gualtieri et al. 2019). The authors show that individuals more intensely exposed to the earthquake subsequently expressed stronger support for redistribution. This suggests that experience of "bad luck" that is beyond control increases demand for policies reducing inequality.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and recent findings. Section 3 describes the methodology, the research design and data. Section 4 reports the experimental results on how correcting these perceptions affects attitudes toward redistribution. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the main findings and their implications for understanding the formation of views on redistributive policies.

2. RELATED LITERATURE

Understanding how self-interest shapes preferences for redistribution requires engaging with two intertwined streams of research. The first stream conceptualises self-interest as grounded in individuals' objective economic position, including individuals' location in the social structure, income and wealth distribution (Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989; Fong 2001; Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln 2007; Luttmer and Singhal 2011; Jæger 2013; Alt and Iversen 2017). The main proposition here is that objective economic positioning systematically shapes individuals' preferences for redistribution: Research typically shows that individuals in economically vulnerable positions are generally more supportive of redistribution (Corneo 2001, 284; Alesina and Giuliano 2011; Rueda and Stegmueller 2019;): lower income, unemployment, and economic insecurity are associated with stronger support for redistribution, whereas individuals with greater economic security often exhibit lower support for redistributive policies (Margalit 2019). Furthermore, according to rational learning theory (Piketty 1995), which explains that people, being rational, update their preferences and make decisions in response to new information,

preferences for redistribution evolve through personal experiences of social mobility and economic changes. The theory predicts that those who improve their income situation (or are expected to improve it) have lower demand for redistribution while those who experienced downward mobility show higher demand for redistribution (Corneo and Gruner 2002; Ravallion and Lokshin 2000; Alesina and Ferrara 2005; Clark and d'Angelo 2013; Siedler and Sonnenberg 2012; Ahrens 2022).

The second stream of literature argues that self-interest reflects people's subjective perceptions of their financial situation and not necessarily objective income standing. In other words, from this perspective it is perceived, rather than objective self-interest, that shapes preferences for redistribution (Cruces et al. 2013; Hauser and Norton 2017; Gimpelson and Treisman 2018; Fernández-Albertos and Kuo 2018; Knell and Stix 2020). In particular, Gimpelson and Treisman (2018) argue that perceptions of self-interest, rather than realities, determine policy preferences, including preferences for redistribution (see also Hauser and Norton 2017; Knell and Stix 2020; Lindner et al. 2023; Hoy and Mager 2021; Bublitz 2022; Kuziemko et al. 2015). Individuals often misperceive their economic position, which leads them to base their preferences for redistribution on inaccurate assessment of self-interest (Cruces et al. 2013; Fernández-Albertos and Kuo 2018; Engelhardt and Wagener 2018; Hoy and Mager 2021).

Self-interest can be subjectively perceived because many individuals operate under conditions of incomplete information or bounded rationality (von Hayek 1937; Simon 1990). Bounded rationality leads to limited awareness of the objective risks associated with individuals' socio-economic position (Ahrens 2024; Engelhardt and Wagener 2018). As Ahrens (2024) argues, "one must know about a risk to insure against it", but individuals may be unaware of the risk they face. As a result, individuals' preferences are shaped by how they interpret their self-interest given the information available to them (ibid). This helps explain why preferences are often grounded in misperceptions of one's relative income and economic status.

Correcting misperceptions about one's economic position provides an opportunity to assess whether preferences for redistribution adjust when individuals learn about their actual economic situation, as predicted by the rational learning hypothesis. At the same time, this expectation is subject to important limitations. First, individuals may struggle to effectively process and incorporate updated information, which constrains fully informed decision-making and leads preferences to diverge from utility-maximizing choices. As a result, even increased awareness of one's exposure to economic risk does not necessarily translate into optimized policy preferences (Ahrens 2024). Second, preferences for redistribution are also shaped by value orientations, particularly normative judgments about the extent of inequality (Fong 2001; Alesina and

Angeletos 2005; Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln 2007; Luttmer and Singhal 2011; Alesina and Giuliano 2011; Kulin and Svallfors 2013; Durante et al. 2014; Saez and Stantcheva 2016; Shin 2018; Griaznova 2025b, 2025a) or unfairness that is considered acceptable or, conversely, in need of corrective intervention (Durante et al., 2014; Shin, 2018). Consequently, even when individuals become more aware of their economic vulnerability, it is possible that information corrections may produce only limited or selective changes in preferences for redistribution.

2.1 Empirical tests

Valuable insights into whether correcting economic misperceptions can shift preferences for redistribution was provided in the literature through the means of survey experiments. Two approaches have been developed. The first aims to provide information on aggregate levels of inequality, whereas the second provides information about individuals' relative economic positioning.

The first stream has focused on informing individuals about aggregate inequality within a country, as share of income of the top 1%, wage gap between different social groups, chances of social mobility or wealth inequality as a signal for individual opportunities for success (Kuziemko et al. 2015; Gimpelson and Treisman 2018; Bruni et al. 2023). These studies demonstrate that providing such information has a rather minor effect and does not alter preferences for redistribution (Ciani et al. 2021).

The second approach focuses on individuals' own economic position by providing accurate information about their relative standing in the income distribution, typically expressed in deciles or percentiles (Cruces et al. 2013; Karadja et al. 2017; Engelhardt and Wagener 2018; Fernández-Albertos and Kuo 2018; Ballard-Rosa et al. 2020; Armingeon and and Bürgisser 2021; Hoy and Mager 2021; Bublitz 2022; Gassmann and Timár 2024). Unlike correction of aggregate inequality perceptions, the evidence shows that correction of misperceptions about own position is more effective, although the effects are small in size and heterogeneous. Individuals who learn that they overestimated their income rank increase their preferences for redistribution, and those who initially under-estimated reduce their support for redistribution (Ciani et al. 2021).

Overall, corrective information appears to produce only modest changes in attitudes toward redistribution. For example, in a survey experiment conducted in Germany, Engelhardt and Wagener (2018), find that providing accurate information about individuals' position in the income distribution has no significant effect on redistributive preferences overall. The only exception is respondents who learn that they are net contributors to the tax–transfer system, who subsequently express lower support for redistribution. Using a comparable design in Spain, Fernández-Albertos

and Kuo (2018), document substantial misperceptions of individuals' income rank and show that revealing one's true position can influence preferences for tax progressivity. However, this effect remains limited and is primarily concentrated among individuals who discover that they are poorer than previously believed. Cruces et al. (2013) identify stronger effects of corrective information among individuals with a positive bias, those who had overestimated their income rank, suggesting that the impact of information depends critically on the direction of prior misperceptions. Expanding beyond single-country analyses, Hoy and Mager (2021) use cross-national survey experiment data to document a counterintuitive finding: informing individuals that they are relatively poorer than they previously believed makes them less concerned about inequality and does not increase their support for redistribution relative to others. The literature also points to substantial heterogeneity in the effects of information about individuals' relative income position across household income levels (Cruces et al., 2013; Fernández-Albertos & Kuo, 2018).

By building on the insights provided in this literature, this study explores both the extent of misperceptions relative to the economic status and the degree to which correcting these misperceptions influences preferences for redistribution. Contributing to ongoing discussions about the effect of misperceptions on individual preferences for redistribution, this study aims to set up a research design that advances our understanding of whether these preferences are driven by self-interest.

2.2 Benchmarking for relative positions in income distribution and misperceptions

Existing studies that inform individuals about their actual relative position in the income distribution, typically expressed in percentiles or deciles, and subsequently assess changes in preferences for redistribution offer valuable insights into the relationship between self-interest and policy attitudes. However, evidence from the literature suggests that learning about one's relative income rank does not consistently translate into stronger or weaker support for government welfare interventions.

Several explanations may account for this disconnect. First, the informational content of rank or decile feedback may be too limited to meaningfully affect preferences. Haaland, Roth and Wohlfart (2023) argue that information treatments often have limited effects on beliefs and preferences because the signal is not sufficiently salient for the recipients. Second, individuals who learn that they are positioned several deciles lower than they previously believed may nonetheless continue to perceive themselves as relatively well-off and may not link their social position to redistributive policies or welfare interventions (Haaland, Roth amnd Wohlfart, 2023). Moreover,

individuals may fail to recognize that they would in fact benefit from certain redistributive policies (Cruces et al. 2013). In addition, the link between awareness of relative income rank and policy preferences may vary across societies with different levels of inequality. Buchel, Luijkx, and Achterberg (2021) demonstrated that in highly unequal societies objective economic disadvantages, rather than subjective status, foster stronger system-justifying attitudes. Their findings suggest that under high inequality the objective self-interest of the poor may be psychologically suppressed, resulting in greater acceptance of income disparities. In this context, self-interest is not always clearly perceived or correctly anticipated, which may help explain the frequently observed weak or null relationship between accurate information about economic position and preferences for redistribution.

In this study, we seek to address some of these limitations by informing individuals whether they are positioned above or below the poverty line. Since prior research shows that individuals tend to perceive themselves as belonging to the middle class or the middle of the income distribution regardless of their objective economic position (Sattler-Bublitz et al. 2024; Kulic et al. 2025), , benchmarking income against the poverty line provides a clearer signal of economic vulnerability and potential gains from redistributive policies.

Compared to information about relative income rank, information on individuals' distance from the poverty threshold may more directly signal perceived self-interest in redistribution. Building on this approach, the present study examines whether individuals increase their demand for redistribution when they learn that their income is closer to the poverty line, and whether support declines when they discover that they are further from it. At a more fundamental level, this perspective also raises the question of whether individuals misperceive their self-interest in the first place.

Focusing on the poverty line as an informational benchmark also aligns closely with structural or societal perspectives on poverty, which emphasize the role of public policies and institutional arrangements in shaping economic conditions and individual opportunities (Smith and Stone 1989). At the same time, however, evidence suggests that the effects of such information may not be straightforward, as individuals may interpret their economic situation through different explanatory lenses. Poverty is often understood in individualistic terms, with personal traits or behaviours such as a lack of effort or ability viewed as the primary causes of economic disadvantage (Cozzarelli, Wilkinson, & Tagler, 2001; Kreidl, 2000). By contrast, alternative accounts attribute poverty to external and uncontrollable factors, such as bad luck or broader structural circumstance (Cozzarelli et al. 2001; Kreidl 2000).

We thus acknowledge that there are competing interpretations to the role of self-interest that can explain how individuals respond to information about their proximity to poverty and, ultimately, their willingness to support redistributive policies.

2.3 Hypotheses

Departing from the existing literature on the role of self-interest in preferences for redistribution, we conceptualize proximity to the poverty line as a direct measure of self-interest and use it to test the rational learning hypothesis. Building on this framework, we expect the effects of information to be heterogeneous, depending on individuals' initial perceived position relative to the poverty line.

H1. Individuals who discover that their income is closer to the poverty line than they had previously believed (i.e., they had a positive bias) will increase their demand for redistribution.

H2. Individuals who discover that their income is further from the poverty line than they had previously believed (i.e., they had a negative bias) will decrease their demand for redistribution.

H3. Individuals with accurate prior perception will show no change in preferences for redistribution.

Next, we combine information about how far one is from the poverty line with crossing the poverty line. By focusing only on over-estimators, those who discover that their income is closer to the poverty line than initially thought, we hypothesize that

H4. Individuals who discover that their household income *is below the poverty line* (strong positive bias) will increase their demand for redistribution more than those who discovered that their income is lower than expected but *still above the poverty line.*

Consistent with the extensive literature documenting substantial heterogeneity in the effects of information about relative income position across household income levels (Cruces et al. 2013; Fernández-Albertos and Kuo 2018), we test our hypotheses both on the full sample and across income groups**.**

3. METHODOLOGY

3.1. Research design and experimental setup

This study employs a survey experiment to test the rational learning hypothesis and assess how individuals adjust their preferences for redistribution when provided with personalised information

about their income position relative to poverty line. The design uses a two-group post-test-only experimental format, enabling us to isolate the causal effect of exposure to information by comparing treated and untreated respondents.

The experiment unfolds in three distinct steps. First, we collect detailed data on respondents' objective household income, their perceived position relative to poverty line, and sociodemographic characteristics. This step ensures that we have both accurate measures of actual and subjective income standing relative to the poverty line as well as covariates for heterogeneity and robustness checks. Second, participants are randomly divided into two equal groups. Participants in the treatment group receive personalized feedback on the exact distance between their household income and the poverty line (in euros), together with information on whether their income falls below or above the poverty threshold. Members of the control group, by contrast, receive neutral placebo information, unrelated descriptive statistics about the distribution of household size in Italy. Finally, all participants complete a battery of post-treatment questions designed to measure preferences for redistribution (see Appendix for additional information). By comparing responses of the participants in treatment and control groups we can assess whether learning about their accurate income situation relative to poverty line affects preferences for redistribution.

3.1.1 Pre-treatment assessment of objective income and subjective position in income distribution

Objective income. At the outset of the survey, all the participants reported their net monthly household income as a part of sociodemographic section. Recognising the centrality of this question to our design, we implemented two-step approach to ensure robust data collection. First, respondents selected one of 25 randomly ordered income intervals, each spanning 250 euros, ranging from "0-250 euro" to "over 6000 euro". The randomisation of income intervals was implemented to mitigate any implicit leads indicating individuals' position in income distribution (Fernández-Albertos and Kuo 2018, 94). Second, respondents were asked to provide their exact net household income in euros as an additional open-ended number. This continuous measure was used to identify the poverty status. For participants who did not answer this question we imputed income using the midpoint of their selected income interval. This decision is based on both methodological and practical considerations. The income intervals in our survey are relatively narrow (€250), making the midpoint a reasonable and consistent estimate. This approach limits the maximum imputation error to ±€125, half the interval width, thereby ensuring a bounded estimation.

Perceived distance from the poverty line. At the experiment's outset participants were asked to estimate monetary distance in euro between their household income and the perceived poverty line for the households of their size. Participants used an interactive slider, where a central value of 0 represented the poverty line, values to the left indicated income below the poverty line, and to the right income above it. The scale on the slider ranged from "-10,000 or more" to "10,000 euros or more", allowing participants to express their perception with flexibility and precision.

Randomisation and group assignment. After reporting the income and other socio-demographic information, participants in the survey were randomly assigned in treatment (n=1000) and control (n=1000) groups following the principles of randomised controlled trials (RCTs). Stratified random assignment was employed to improve balance and enhance validity and reliability of the findings. Stratification was performed according to the following demographic variables: gender, age, education, occupation and macro-geographical regions in Italy (North, Centre, South, and Islands). This stratification provides balanced representation across strata, increasing the comparability of treatment and control groups.

An a priori power analyses (0.9, alpha =0.05) was conducted with G-Power (Erdfelder et al. 1996), aiming to detect small size effects of less than 0.15 SD in line with the literature that shows limited impact of information on objective conditions for preferences for redistribution. Additional sensitivity power analyses with G-Power shows that effects as small as 0.13 can be detected with the sample size of 2000 respondents. Our sample is considerably larger than in the prior research on correcting misperceptions of income ranks, where treatment groups typically range from 500 to 600 participants (Cruces et al. 2013; Karadja et al. 2017; Engelhardt and Wagener 2018; Bublitz 2022). By employing a larger sample, this study increases the precision and enhanced statistical power.

Information treatment. Participants in the treatment group received personalized feedback about their actual situation relative to poverty line, tailored to their household size. Poverty line thresholds were taken from the most recent available data given by Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istat) for 2022. The poverty line for one-person households is €726,53, €1210.89 for two-person, €1610.48 for three-person, €1973.75 for four-person, €2300.69 for five-person, €2615.52 for six-person, and €2906.14 for households with seven or more members. For example, a member of a four-person household with a net monthly household income €6125, who initially believed that their household income was €1500 above the poverty line, received the following feedback: "*In the previous question, you estimated that your family income is 1500 euros above the poverty threshold. According to Istat, in 2022, the closest available year, a family of 4 members*

is considered poor with less than 1874.5 euros. It means that you real position is at least 4250.5 euros above the poverty line".

This feedback was dynamically generated for each participant, based on their earlier reported income, household size, Istat data on poverty line thresholds, and initial perceived distance from the poverty line. Objective distance from the poverty line was calculated as difference between the household net monthly income and poverty line threshold for a household of their size. This approach ensured clarity, personalisation and relevance to each participant's economic situation.

Members of the control group, by contrast, received unrelated placebo information consisting of descriptive statistics on the distribution of household size (number of household members) in Italy: "*Currently (in 2022, the most recent year for which data is available) approximately 60 million people live in Italy, distributed across 26 million households. One-third of all households in Italy consist of a single person (34%). Slightly less than one-third (29%) are two-person households. Far fewer households are larger in size: 18% of households consist of three people, and 14% consist of four people. Large families are now rare in Italy: 3% of households consist of five people, and only 1% consist of six or more people*" (see Appendix for details). This approach ensures that both groups experienced a similar cognitive load, boredom, and emotional engagement throughout the survey.

3.1.2 Post-treatment measurement of preferences for redistribution

Following the treatment, participants answered a set of questions measuring multidimensional nature of the preferences for redistribution, enabling more nuanced and comprehensive conclusions both about general redistributive attitudes and context-specific relevant to Italy. These questions addressed four dimensions: support for poverty reduction measures in Italy, perceptions of government responsibility in addressing income disparities between the rich and the poor, attitudes towards progressive taxation and views on fairness of income inequality. There are four dependent variables in the research measuring these dimensions of preferences for redistribution:

1. Government responsibility in addressing income disparities: using a scale from 0 (completely disagree) to 10 (completely agree), respondents rated their agreement with the statement that "It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes". This statement resembles the conventional measure from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) 2019.

2. Views on fairness of income inequality: using the same 10-point scale respondents rated their support for the statement "Large differences in people's incomes are acceptable to properly reward

differences in talents and efforts". To measure this dimension, we used established instrument from the European Social Survey, wave 8. The higher the support to this statement, the lower is the support for distribution.

3. Attitudes towards progressive taxation: respondents expressed their level of agreement, on the same 10-point scale, with the statement "People with high incomes should pay a larger share of their income in taxes than those with low incomes". Here we adopted a conventional measure of attitudes towards progressive taxation from the ISSP 2019. We reformulated a question into a statement and changed a scale of measurement from 5-point to 10-point.

4. Support of anti-poverty measures introduced by Italian government: Question: "Over the last years Italian government has introduced several measures to reduce poverty and provide people with monetary benefits regardless their working conditions. Do you think the government should increase the funding for these programmes, leave it at the level it is now, or cut it? Remember, in order to increase funding for these programmes, other government expenditures must be reduced or taxes raised". Response options include: cancel them completely (coded as "1"), significantly reduce ("2"), "slightly reduce" ("3"), leave at the same level ("4"), slightly increase ("5"), significantly increase ("6"). This is a novel question focused on specific Italian context.

We have preregistered our research design with Center for Open Science registry.

3.2. Empirical strategy

A key advantage of our survey experiment lies in its ability to mitigate endogeneity concerns, as treated individuals are randomly selected from the sample. This design ensures that any observed differences in preferences for redistribution can be casually attributed to the information treatment rather than to the confounding factors. Given this straightforward empirical framework, we employ an ordinary least squares regression model (OLS) to estimate the treatment effect.

The baseline empirical model is specified as follows:

$$y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x + \beta_2 z + \beta_3 xz + \lambda W + \varepsilon \quad (1)$$

where y represents one of the four measures of preferences for redistribution; x is an indicator of the perceived position relative to the poverty line, defined in several alternative ways (described below); z is a dummy variable for treatment assignment; xz is the interaction term, capturing the treatment effect; W is a set of control variables that account for any imbalances in demographic characteristics between treatment and control groups, that includes sex, age, education,

employment status, income deciles, household size, ideology (left, central-left, central-right, right), macro regions; ε is the standard idiosyncratic error term.

In the remaining of this section, we adapt the baseline model to the specific hypotheses under investigation and comment on the sign and statistical significance of the coefficients most relevant to each hypothesis.

To comprehensively test our hypotheses, we examine several measures of perceived income situation relative to the poverty line (x factor). As a preliminary step, we use perceived distance from the poverty line as a straightforward indicator for descriptive purposes.

Next, to test Hypotheses 1 through 3 we classify participants into 3 categories based on whether they overestimated (positive bias), underestimated (negative bias) or accurately perceived their income situation relative to poverty line. Bias is defined as difference between the perceived distance from the poverty line and the objective distance. To account for minor perceptual biases, we classify participants as accurate perceivers using the most conservative threshold if their bias falls within ±0.1 standard deviations of the true distance from the poverty line. Participants with a negative bias (who perceived themselves poorer than they are) are categorized as *under-estimators*, while those with a positive bias (who perceived themselves as richer than they are) are defined as *over-estimators*.

In the third step, in addition to categorial classification, we use continuous measure of misperception, defined as the difference between perceived and objective distance from the poverty line. This approach allows us capturing treatment effect across the full distribution of biases rather than relying solely on group-based comparisons.

Additionally, to test Hypothesis 4, we estimate how treatment effect varies among individuals who discovered that they are poorer than they previously believed. Specifically, we distinguish between two groups: those who, after treatment, learned that their financial situation is worse than they had believed but still above the poverty line, and those who found that their household income falls below the poverty line.

Finally, to explore the heterogeneity across income reported in the previous literature, we interact treatment with income quintiles. This additional layer of analysis enables us to explore differences in treatment effects across the income distribution.

3.3. Data, sample and measures of distance

We conducted an online survey using computer-assisted web interviewing (CAWI) in Italy between November and December 2024, targeting individuals aged 18–70. The experiment was

embedded within a broader survey comprising approximately 12,000 respondents, from which a subsample of 2,000 participants was selected for the experimental analysis. The survey was administered by the Italian survey agency Dynata, and the research design was approved by the Ethics Committee.

Quota sampling was used to ensure that the final sample was representative of the Italian population with respect to five key socio-demographic characteristics: age (18–24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, and 65–70), gender, education (low: up to three years of vocational education or lower; medium: high school diploma or non-university advanced training diploma; high: bachelor's degree or higher), employment status (employed, unemployed, and inactive), and macro-geographical region (North-West, North-East, Centre, South, and Islands). Descriptive statistics for the sample are reported in Table 1.

Regarding our final sample, a total of 65 cases were excluded. First, extreme outliers were removed to ensure the reliability of the analysis. Respondents reporting monthly household income below €50 (9 cases) or above €40,000 (5 cases) were excluded. Cases with perceived distance from the poverty line exceeding the slider range of €0–€10,000 (9 cases), or with misperceptions of the distance from the poverty line beyond ±€15,000 (4 cases), were also removed. Finally, to reduce the influence of extreme values, the variable measuring misperception of the distance from the poverty line was trimmed by ±1% of its distribution (38 cases). An additional three cases were excluded because respondents selected "other" for the gender variable, which was treated as missing in the analyses.

TABLE 1. SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS

		Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Sex				
	Man	939	48.6	48.6
	Woman	993	51.4	100
Age				
	18-24	201	10.4	10.4
	25-34	303	15.68	26.09
	35-44	363	18.79	44.88
	45-54	467	24.17	69.05
	55-64	424	21.95	90.99
	65-70	174	9.01	100
Education				
	Low	618	31.99	31.99
	Medium	847	43.84	75.83
	High	467	24.17	100
HH size				
	1	271	14.03	14.03

2	514	26.6	40.63
3	545	28.21	68.84
4	438	22.67	91.51
5	119	6.16	97.67
6 and more	45	2.33	100
Quantiles			
1	366	18.94	18.94
2	408	21.12	40.06
3	408	21.12	61.18
4	375	19.41	80.59
5	375	19.41	100
Employment status			
Employed	1,113	57.61	57.61
Unemployed	209	10.82	68.43
Inactive	553	28.62	97.05
Other	57	2.95	100
migration background			
no migration background	1,737	89.91	89.91
1st generation	86	4.45	94.36
2nd generation	109	5.64	100
Political attitudes			
Left	412	21.33	21.33
Centre-Left	430	22.26	43.58
Centre-Right	361	18.69	62.27
Right	415	21.48	83.75
Missing	314	16.25	100
Regions			
North West	532	27.54	27.54
North East	364	18.84	46.38
Center	384	19.88	66.25
South and Islands	652	33.75	100
Total	1,932	100	

The next section outlines the distribution of the main measures. Figure 1, Panel A presents the distribution of perceived and objective distance from the poverty line, while Panel B shows the distribution of misperceptions as a difference between perceived and objective distance from the poverty line. The data suggests a systematic tendency among participants to overestimate their income position relative to poverty line. Further analyses on the major correlates of these misperceptions are available in the appendix (Figure A5, table A2).

FIGURE 1. PERCEIVED, OBJECTIVE AND MISPERCEIVED DISTANCE FROM THE POVERTY LINE



Table 2 summarizes the distribution of under-estimators, over-estimators and accurate perceivers across treatment and control groups. Majority of the participants (57%) overestimate the distance of their income relative to the poverty line, 30% underestimate it, and 14 % are relatively accurate in their estimates (with +-0.1 SD). Notably, this distribution is consistent across treatment and control groups, ensuring comparability for empirical analysis and validity of causal inference. Moreover, all three groups are adequately populated, providing a robust basis for testing hypothesis.

TABLE 2 DISTRIBUTION OF UNDER-ESTIMATORS, OVER-ESTIMATORS AND ACCURATE PERCEIVERS ACROSS TREATMENT AND CONTROL GROUPS

		Treatment		
		Control	Treatment	Total
Under-estimators		270	311	581
	%	27.92	32.23	30.07
Accurate perceivers(+-0.1sd)		136	120	256
	%	14.06	12.44	13.25
Over-estimators		561	534	1,095
	%	58.01	55.34	56.68
Total		967	965	1932
		100.00	100.00	100.00

First row has *frequencies* and second row has *column percentages*

The widespread overestimation of the distance of income from the poverty line offers evidence that self-interest is not appropriately perceived, and is an ideal research setting to test our hypotheses. This context allows us to test the rational learning argument by examining whether learning about the exposure to poverty through corrective feedback affects demand for redistribution and vice versa. Specifically, our empirical strategy at this step compares preferences for redistribution across treatment and control group between over-estimators, under-estimators and accurate perceivers.

4. MAIN FINDINGS

4.1. Effect of correcting misperceptions of income situation on preferences for redistribution

Following the empirical strategy, we estimate causal effect of information treatment on preferences for redistribution across four dimensions: (A) the government's responsibility in addressing income disparities, (B) perceptions of the fairness of income inequality, (C) attitudes toward progressive taxation, and (D) support for anti-poverty measures implemented by the Italian government. First, we compared the effects of treatment across over-estimators, under-estimators and accurate perceivers. To minimise any remaining confounding, we control for sociodemographic characteristics introduced earlier.

Table **3** explicates the main effect of treatment and interaction effects, while the complete table with control variables is available in the Appendix (Table A3a and 3b).

Figure 2 presents predictive margins for the four dimensions of preferences for redistribution based on the OLS estimates (see Equation 1) and presented in

Table **3**. We followed methodological approach of Goldstein and Healy (1995) for graphical representation of pairwise comparisons, who propose plotting narrower confidence intervals (1.39×SE) so that non-overlap directly indicates statistically significant differences between groups.

Our findings show that overall the information corrective treatment is not effective in changing preferences for redistribution and there is only limited variation by individuals' perceptions of their distance from the poverty line. More specifically,

Table **3** shows that under-estimators who receive the treatment decrease their support for government responsibility to reduce differences between rich and poor by 0.16 points (Column A), for progressive taxation by 0.3 points (C) and for antipoverty measures by 0.15 points (D).

This change is in expected direction, though not statistically significant. At the same time, there is a counter-intuitive decrease of the support to the statement that inequality is a reward for talent and effort by 0.07 points but it is not statistically significant (Column B). The analyses for accurate perceivers who are treated show that on average they do not significantly differ from under-estimators in their preferences for redistribution. For anti-poverty measures, accurate perceivers exhibit higher baseline support, but their preferences are not significantly affected by the treatment, in line with the theoretical expectations.

Information feedback appears to play a more important role in shaping preferences for redistribution among over-estimators with regard to support for progressive taxation. Over-estimators who learnt that they were closer to the poverty line than they thought expressed higher agreement for support to progressive taxation by 0.25 points ($p<0.1$) compared to the control group (+0.56 in comparison to under-estimators). There is no statistically significant difference between treated and untreated over-estimators on other outcomes.

Figure 2 shows predicted values for different dimensions of preferences for redistribution across different treatment conditions. For instance, panel C for progressive taxation shows that under-estimators tend to decrease their support for progressive taxation after treatment. By contrast, overestimators who learned that they are closer to the poverty line than they thought show generally higher support for progressive taxation compared to control groups, although the results are not statistically significant at conventional levels in neither case. Panel D displays a difference between treatment and control group among accurate perceivers: those who are treated and get the information that they are accurate, decrease their support for anti-poverty measures.

Taken together, these findings describe the nuanced nature of the information feedback on different dimensions of preferences for redistribution and only very limited support for our hypotheses. The treatment mainly matters for over-estimators: they increase moderately their support for progressive taxation. This finding supports Hypothesis 1 for one dimension of preferences for redistribution, but not for three others (government responsibility to reduce difference between rich and poor, inequality is fair as a reward for talent and effort, and support for recently implemented anti-poverty measures). Hypothesis 2 that states that under-estimators reduce demand for redistribution in treatment group finds partial confirmation in one dimension: those who discovered that they are better off than they thought are less inclined to support progressive taxation compared to those who did not get corrective information. Hypothesis 3 that states that preferences for redistribution are the same among accurate perceivers in treatment and control group was largely supported with one exception: treated participants showed lower support for anti-poverty measures.

TABLE 3. EFFECT OF TREATMENT ON PREFERENCES FOR REDISTRIBUTION

VARIABLES	(1) Reduce diff. between rich and poor	(2) Inequality as a reward for talent and effort	(3) Progressive taxation	(4) Antipoverty Measures
Treatment				
1, treatment	-0.158	-0.072	-0.310	-0.152
	(0.186)	(0.202)	(0.195)	(0.116)
Groups by perception of distance from the PL				
2, accurate perceivers (+-0.1sd)	-0.027	-0.081	-0.035	0.318**
	(0.237)	(0.256)	(0.248)	(0.148)
3, over-estimators	0.019	-0.031	-0.340*	-0.079
	(0.169)	(0.183)	(0.177)	(0.106)
1.treatment# accurate perceivers	0.292	0.459	0.216	-0.239
	(0.337)	(0.365)	(0.353)	(0.210)
1.treatment#over-estimators	0.176	-0.134	0.557**	0.099
	(0.230)	(0.249)	(0.241)	(0.144)
Constant	6.960***	4.561***	7.052***	4.227***
	(0.318)	(0.345)	(0.333)	(0.199)
Observations	1,932	1,932	1,932	1,932
R-squared	0.052	0.051	0.058	0.064

Note: Under-estimators is a reference category. Standard errors in parentheses. ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1, baseline controls are applied.

FIGURE 2 PREDICTIVE MARGINS OF PREFERENCES FOR REDISTRIBUTION ACROSS TREATMENT AND CONTROL GROUPS FOR OVER-ESTIMATORS, UNDER-ESTIMATORS AND ACCURATE PERCEIVERS, 95% CI FOR PAIRWISE COMPARISON





4.2. Intensity of information treatment and preferences for redistribution

In a second step, we test hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 using a continuous measure of misperceptions instead of a categorical one, namely the difference between perceived and actual distance from the poverty line (expressed in units of €100). To assess how the effect of the information treatment varies with individuals' level of misperception, we regress preferences for redistribution on the treatment, the continuous measure of misperception, and their interaction.

Using a continuous measure of misperceptions, the results appear similar to the categorical specification (Table A. 4 from the appendix). Most notably, regarding support for progressive taxation: the positive and significant interaction term (0.01, $p<0.05$) suggests that the support for progressive taxation in the treatment group increases with higher misperception. In other words, the difference between control and treatment group increases with increase in misperception, the larger is the misperception, the larger is the correction. No comparable interaction effects are found for the other outcomes. Finally, the treatment reduces support for anti-poverty measures on average, with no evidence of heterogeneity by misperception (0.14, $p<0.05$).

These patterns are clearly visible graphically. Regarding support for progressive taxation, Figure 3 (Panel 3) shows how the gap between treatment and control group becomes smaller at larger values of over-estimation expressed in euros. In other words, the corrective information becomes less effective on preferences for progressive taxation when over-estimation is significant.

Taken together, these results provide a more nuanced understanding of the treatment effects, although the support for hypotheses remains limited, with the exception of progressive taxation.

FIGURE 3 PREDICTIVE MARGINS OF PREFERENCES FOR REDISTRIBUTION BY LEVEL OF MISPERCEPTION



4.3. Crossing poverty line in learning

We test Hypothesis 4 by restricting the analysis to respondents who overestimated their distance from the poverty line and received corrective information treatment. The models (Table A. 5, n=534) presented in Figure 4 examine whether those who learnt that they had crossed poverty line experience more support for redistribution in comparison to those who remained above it. Results show no significant difference across two groups for all four dimensions of preferences for redistribution rejecting Hypothesis 4.

FIGURE 4 EFFECT OF LEARNING ABOUT CROSSING THE POVERTY LINE ON PREFERENCES FOR REDISTRIBUTION AMONG TREATED OVER-ESTIMATORS, PREDICTED MARGINS, 95 % PAIRWISE COMPARISONS



4.4. Heterogeneity of results by income quintiles

Finally, we assess whether the effect of the information treatment vary across income groups, as previous research suggests that individuals at different points of the income distribution have distinct redistributive interests and may respond differently to information about their economic position. In particular, previous research indicate that individuals in the lowest income deciles are particularly responsive to information about their economic standing (Cruces et al. 2013; Fernández-Albertos and Kuo 2018).

Figure 5 shows that our findings partially support this observation. Among respondents in the lowest income quintile (€ 50-1100) we observe significant difference in preference for

redistribution between treatment and control groups. Specifically, individuals who underestimated their income distance from the poverty line and learned that they were better off than initially thought expressed lower support for the government's role in reducing income disparities (-0.98, $p<0.05$) and for progressive taxation (-1.05, $p<0.05$) compared to the control group (Figure 5, Panels A and C). Conversely, over-estimators from the lowest income quintile showed a higher average support for progressive taxation compared to the control group (0.6, $p<0.1$).

At the same time, the results suggest that responsiveness to the treatment is not limited to low-income groups. Members of the highest income quintile are sensitive to information treatment and adjust their preferences in response to the updated information when expressing their support for progressive taxation. Specifically, treated under-estimators in the fifth quintile showed less support for progressive taxation compared to the control group (-0.91, $p<0.05$). Also, those in the fourth income quintile who learned that they were better off and their income was further from the poverty line showed less support for the Italian government's anti-poverty measures compared to the control group.

These findings suggest that information about individual economic situation can affect some dimensions of preferences for redistribution not only of lower income individuals but also higher income. Individuals from the highest income quintile can still adjust their preferences based on new information, especially when it enhances their perception of relative advantage in redistribution through taxation. In all other cases, however, the treatment effect remains statistically insignificant.

FIGURE 5 HETEROGENEOUS EFFECT OF TREATMENT ACROSS INCOME QUINTILES, PREDICTIVE MARGINS OF PREFERENCES FOR REDISTRIBUTION



5. CONCLUSION

This article addresses a long-standing question in the study of redistributive preferences: to what extent are individuals' preferences shaped by material self-interest? Previous research has shown that people frequently misperceive their economic position and that these subjective perceptions may influence redistributive preferences more strongly than objective economic conditions. Building on this insight, we examine whether providing individuals with accurate information about their economic position alters their support for redistribution. Specifically, we test the rational learning hypothesis through a survey experiment that informs participants of the exact distance between their household income and the official poverty line, thereby providing a clear and easily interpretable benchmark of economic self-interest. Unlike previous studies, which have typically relied on relative measures of income position such as income ranks or percentiles, our design uses proximity to the poverty line as a more salient measure of self-interest. To our knowledge, this is the first study to examine whether objective information based on this benchmark affects multiple dimensions of redistributive preferences.

The analysis proceeded in two steps. First, we measured the degree of misperceptions about the income distance from the poverty line and then we compared the effect of this misperception in treatment and control groups across four different outcomes of distribution: government responsibility to reduce income inequality, fairness of inequality as a reward for talent and effort, support of progressive taxation, and support of anti-poverty measures of Italian government.

Our findings confirm previous evidence showing that individuals tend to have biased estimates of their economic position in income distribution. This tendency is also confirmed for our novel method of measuring position in income distribution using benchmarking technique through perceived proximity to the poverty line. Our research however shows that correction of these misperceptions is effective only in some circumstances. Three key findings emerge from the analysis. First, individuals appear relatively reluctant to adjust their preferences for the most dimensions of redistribution (government responsibility to reduce inequality, inequality is fair as a reward for talent and effort, support for recent antipoverty measures) even when confronted with direct information signalling their economic self-interest. Second, corrective information affects individual support for progressive taxation. Respondents who learned that they were economically more vulnerable than previously believed tended to express stronger support for progressive taxation, whereas those who discovered that they were better off became less supportive. However, the latter effect remains substantively meaningful but statistically insignificant. Third, our analysis reveals heterogeneous effects across income quintiles. While previous research has shown that

individuals in the lowest income quintiles are especially responsive to information treatment (Cruces et al. 2013), we find that also upper income quintiles adjust their preferences. Notably, respondents in the fifth income quintile who learn that their household income is further from the poverty line than they had previously believed express lower support for progressive taxation than those in the control group. Similarly, members of the fourth income quintile who realised they were better off showed lower support for recent anti-poverty measures implemented by the Italian government, compared to untreated counterparts. Low-income individuals from the first quintile in response to treatment corrected their support for government responsibility to reduce inequality and for progressive taxation.

Overall, our findings provide limited support for rational learning argument, which is present under two conditions: information treatment must clearly signal self-interest in redistribution and preferences for redistribution must be "pocket related", like progressive taxation. Under this condition preferences for redistribution are sensitive to information, though the magnitude of these effects is modest. At the same time, broader normative judgements about inequality, like government responsibility or perceived justice are more resistant to change.

To conclude, public opinion may remain stable also in the face of rising inequality partly because many individuals misperceive their economic standing. Correcting these biases can modestly shift support for redistributive policies related to individual gains and losses. Modest results about the effect of rational leaning on preferences for redistribution open the door for further improvement of the measurement of self-interest in redistribution and designs of information treatment. These findings point toward an important research agenda: examining how informational interventions interact with ideological factors and structural constrains to shape political and economic attitudes over time.

Several limitations should be acknowledged. First, respondents may not fully process or internalize the corrective information provided, particularly in a survey setting. Preferences for redistribution were measured immediately after treatment; different results may emerge over a longer time horizon. Second, mechanisms beyond self-interest may also be at play including normative considerations such as the stigma associated with poverty. Third, we rely on self-reported income, which may be subject to measurement error. Moreover, our analysis focuses on income and does not account for wealth-related factors, which could be equally or more important.

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Appendix

QUESTIONNAIRE

Objective income

1. *What is your household's NET MONTHLY INCOME? Consider the monthly income remaining after paying taxes and all deductions*". Respondents were presented with 25 randomly ordered income intervals, each spanning €250, ranging from "0-250 €" to "over 6000 €".
2. *The question about household's average net monthly income is crucial for our research, please indicate the EXACT net MONTHLY INCOME of your household*". To reduce potential confusion between monthly and annual income or net and gross income, we emphasised these distinctions using capital letters.

Subjectively perceived distance from the poverty line

Participants were asked to estimate monetary distance in euro between their household income and the perceived poverty line for the households of their size. Participants used an interactive slider, where a central value of 0 represented the poverty line. The slider allowed adjustments in either direction: to the left of 0, indicating an income below the poverty line, or to the right, meaning an income above the poverty line (Figure A 1). The scale on the slider ranged from "-10,000 or more" to "10,000 euros or more", enabling participants to report their perception with considerable flexibility and specificity.

FIGURE A 1 MEASUREMENT OF THE PERCEIVED DISTANCE FROM THE POVERTY LINE

Original version in Italian

Translation



Note: the slider that was used in the final version of the questionnaire is limited to -10000, +10000 threshold.

Information treatment

Figure A 2 illustrate an example of the treatment for a respondent from a four-member household with a net monthly household income of €6125 (the midpoint of the highest income interval), who initially believed that their household income was €1500 above the poverty line. The treatment feedback provided to such participants was framed as follows: "*In the previous question, you estimated that your family income is 1500 euros above the poverty threshold. According to Istat, in 2022, the closest available year, a family of 4 members is considered poor with less than 1874.5 euros. It means that you real position is at least 4250.5 euros above the poverty line*".

The treatment message was tailored to incorporate each respondents' objective information, perceived distance from the poverty line and corrected feedback. The numbers indicating perceived distance from the poverty line, terms "above" and "below", household size were dynamically generated based on respondents' earlier answers on relative survey questions. The official poverty line threshold, drawn from Istat data, was determined by household size specified by respondents at the initial stage of the survey. Personalised feedback to the participants about objective distance from the poverty line was calculated as difference between the household net monthly income and poverty line threshold for a household of their size. This approach ensured clarity, personalisation and relevance to each participant's economic situation.

FIGURE A 2 INFORMATION TREATMENT

Original version in Italian



Translation

Placebo

Members of the control group were presented with statistics on household size in Italy, serving as a placebo treatment (Figure A 3). When translated into English the placebo treatment is as follows: "*Currently (in 2022, the most recent year for which data is available) approximately 60 million people live in Italy, distributed across 26 million households. One-third of all households in Italy consist of a single person (34%). Slightly less than one-third (29%) are two-person households. Far fewer households are larger in size: 18% of households consist of three people, and 14% consist of four people. Large families are now rare in Italy: 3% of households consist of five people, and only 1% consist of six or more people*". This approach ensures that both groups experience comparable levels of cognitive load, boredom, and emotional response throughout the survey.

FIGURE A 3 PLACEBO TREATMENT

Original version in Italian

Attualmente (nel 2022, l'anno più vicino disponibile) in Italia vivono circa 60 milioni di persone suddivise in 26 milioni di famiglie. Un terzo di tutte le famiglie in Italia sono composte da una sola persona (34%). Poco meno di un terzo (29%) sono nuclei familiari composti da due persone. Molto più meno famiglie sono famiglie abbastanza grandi: il 18% delle famiglie è composto da tre persone e il 14% da quattro persone. Le famiglie numerose sono ormai rare in Italia: il 3% delle famiglie è composto da 5 persone e l'1% da 6 o più persone.



Translation

Currently (in 2022, the closest available year), approximately 60 million people live in Italy, divided into 26 million households. One-third of all households in Italy are made up of just one person (34%). Just under a third (29%) are two-person households. Significantly fewer families are relatively large: 18% of households are made up of three people and 14% of four people. Large families are now rare in Italy: 3% of households are made up of five people and 1% of six or more people.



SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS BY TREATMENT

TABLE A. 1 SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS OF TREATMENT AND CONTROL GROUP

		control	treatment	Total
		%	%	%
Sex				
Man		48.4	48.8	48.6
Woman		51.6	51.2	51.4
Total		100	100	100
DAGE. Hidden - Ricodifica in base a Q1				
18-24		10.4	10.4	10.4
25-34		15.5	15.9	15.7
35-44		19.1	18.4	18.8
45-54		24.1	24.2	24.2
55-64		21.9	22	21.9
65-70		8.9	9.1	9
Total		100	100	100
Education (short)				
Low		31.9	32.1	32
Medium		43.7	43.9	43.8
High		24.4	23.9	24.2
Total		100	100	100
HH size				
	1	15.6	12.4	14
	2	25.9	27.4	26.6
	3	29.8	26.6	28.2
	4	20.4	25	22.7
	5	6	6.3	6.2
6 and more		2.4	2.3	2.3
Total		100	100	100
5 quantiles of inc				
	1	20.2	17.7	18.9
	2	21.9	20.3	21.1
	3	22.2	20	21.1
	4	16.1	22.7	19.4
	5	19.5	19.3	19.4
Total		100	100	100
Employment status				
Employed		57.8	57.4	57.6
Unemployed		10.4	11.2	10.8
Inactive		28.5	28.7	28.6
Other		3.2	2.7	3
Total		100	100	100

FIGURE A 4 OBJECTIVE DISTANCE FROM THE POVERTY LINE, PERCEIVED DISTANCE AND MISPERCEPTION AND PREFERENCES FOR REDISTRIBUTION. OLS, CI 95%. ESTIMATES FROM SEPARATE MODELS WITH ALL CONTROLS AS PER TABLE 1.



Note: Our analyses that link objective, perceived circumstances and misperceptions related to poverty highlight that perceived position is often more important than lived reality

Main characteristics of biases in perceptions

Our analysis reveals that majority of individuals overestimate the distance of their income from the poverty line misperceiving their self-interest As discussed in the Empirical Strategy section, 56% of respondents believe that they are further from the poverty line than they are. **Error! Reference source not found.** illustrates this pattern, using predictive margins of continuous misperception variable across key sociodemographic variables: gender, age, household size, education, income quintile, employment status, migration background, and geographic regions. The figure shows that overestimation of the distance from the poverty line is widespread across nearly all groups. Both men and women overestimate their position relative to the poverty line, as do young adults (18–24 years old), middle-aged individuals, and those with medium or higher levels of education. The same pattern is observed among members of larger households, individuals in the first four income quintiles, both employed and inactive individuals, natives, and immigrants, and across all geographic regions.

At the same time, some groups show relatively higher accuracy in estimating their positions. Young adults (aged 25-34), older adults (65-70), individuals with lower educational attainment,

and members of smaller households tend to give more accurate assessments of their distance from the poverty line. Two groups even show tendencies to underestimate: individuals living alone estimate the distance of their income from the poverty line, on average, €176 closer to the poverty line than it is. Similarly, those in the fifth income quintile underestimate the distance their income from the poverty line by approximately €182. This findings partly partially support the central tendency bias argument, which predicts that the poor overestimate their position in the income distribution, while the rich underestimate it (Bublitz 2022). However, when we treat poverty line as a reference point, we find that not only low income, but also middle-income quintiles tend to overestimate their income situation. This means that when thinking about poverty lines, not only the poor but also middle-income groups perceive themselves to be better off than they actually are.

FIGURE A 5 CORRELATES OF MISPERCEPTIONS OF DISTANCE OF INCOME FROM THE POVERTY LINE, PREDICTIVE MARGINS



TABLE A. 2 CORRELATES OF MISPERCEPTION OF INCOME POSITION (REGRESSION COEFFICIENT FOR FIGURE A5)

VARIABLES	(1) misperception
Sex	
1, Woman	-1.5008
	(1.264)
Age	
2, 25-34	-2.5564
	(2.509)

3, 35-44	-1.0177
	(2.426)
4, 45-54	-2.0022
	(2.353)
5, 55-64	-1.8970
	(2.387)
6, 65-70	-4.6055
	(2.941)
Education	
2, Medium	4.4062***
	(1.478)
3, High	4.8573***
	(1.816)
HH size	
2, 2	2.5639
	(2.054)
3, 3	6.9537***
	(2.043)
4, 4	9.0608***
	(2.150)
5, 5	8.7513***
	(3.016)
6, 6 and more	16.0409***
	(4.410)
Income quantiles	
2	3.7322*
	(1.945)
3	1.2816
	(2.006)
4	0.5542
	(2.142)
5	-5.5716**
	(2.190)
Employment status	
2, Unemployed	-0.1110
	(2.158)
3, Inactive	2.2577
	(1.662)
9, Other	-2.2833
	(3.660)
Migration background	
1, 1st generation	4.6934
	(3.017)
2, 2nd generation	5.4707**
	(2.687)
Political attitudes	
2, Centre-Left	-0.5516
	(1.841)
3, Centre-Right	1.8250
	(1.926)
4, Right	2.0285
	(1.871)
5, Missing	-1.5361
	(2.058)
Regions	
2, North East	-0.2326
	(1.818)
3, Center	1.2734
	(1.806)
4, South and Islands	0.2930
	(1.637)
Constant	-4.0251

	(3.533)
Observations	1,932
R-squared	0.044

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE A. 3A EFFECT OF TREATMENT ON PREFERENCES FOR REDISTRIBUTION (EXTENSION OF TABLE 3)

VARIABLES	(1) Reduce diff. between rich and poor	(2) Inequality as a reward for talent and effort	(3) Progressive taxation	(4) Antipoverty Measures
Treatment				
1, treatment	-0.158	-0.072	-0.310	-0.152
	(0.186)	(0.202)	(0.195)	(0.116)
Groups by perception of distance from the PL				
2, accurate perceivers(+-0.1sd)	-0.027	-0.081	-0.035	0.318**
	(0.237)	(0.256)	(0.248)	(0.148)
3, over-estimators	0.019	-0.031	-0.340*	-0.079
	(0.169)	(0.183)	(0.177)	(0.106)
1.treatment# accurate perceivers	0.292	0.459	0.216	-0.239
	(0.337)	(0.365)	(0.353)	(0.210)
1.treatment#over-estimators	0.176	-0.134	0.557**	0.099
	(0.230)	(0.249)	(0.241)	(0.144)
Sex				
1, Woman	0.137	-0.340***	0.084	-0.166**
	(0.106)	(0.115)	(0.111)	(0.066)
Age				
2, 25-34	0.436**	-0.013	0.148	0.063
	(0.211)	(0.229)	(0.221)	(0.132)
3, 35-44	0.257	-0.025	0.493**	0.148
	(0.204)	(0.221)	(0.214)	(0.127)
4, 45-54	0.701***	0.035	0.810***	0.147
	(0.198)	(0.214)	(0.207)	(0.123)
5, 55-64	0.784***	0.050	0.952***	0.123
	(0.201)	(0.217)	(0.210)	(0.125)
6, 65-70	0.704***	0.137	1.218***	0.371**
	(0.248)	(0.268)	(0.259)	(0.155)
Education				
2, Medium	-0.128	-0.175	-0.016	0.164**
	(0.125)	(0.135)	(0.131)	(0.078)
3, High	-0.350**	0.136	-0.116	0.106
	(0.153)	(0.166)	(0.160)	(0.096)
HH size				
2, 2	0.222	0.016	0.155	-0.025
	(0.173)	(0.188)	(0.182)	(0.108)
3, 3	0.511***	0.026	0.393**	-0.113
	(0.174)	(0.188)	(0.182)	(0.109)
4, 4	0.443**	0.338*	0.379**	-0.011
	(0.184)	(0.199)	(0.193)	(0.115)
5, 5	0.368	0.365	0.060	-0.073
	(0.255)	(0.276)	(0.267)	(0.159)
6, 6 and more	-0.122	0.093	0.824**	-0.176
	(0.374)	(0.405)	(0.392)	(0.233)
Income quintile				

2	-0.143	0.249	0.069	0.008
	(0.164)	(0.177)	(0.171)	(0.102)
3	-0.319*	0.477***	-0.099	0.104
	(0.169)	(0.183)	(0.177)	(0.106)
4	-0.028	0.333*	-0.037	0.100
	(0.181)	(0.196)	(0.190)	(0.113)
5	-0.118	0.583***	-0.020	0.200*
	(0.187)	(0.202)	(0.196)	(0.117)
Employment status				
2, Unemployed	0.248	-0.262	0.058	0.344***
	(0.182)	(0.197)	(0.190)	(0.113)
3, Inactive	0.166	0.041	0.161	0.032
	(0.140)	(0.151)	(0.146)	(0.087)
9, Other	-0.078	-0.292	0.161	-0.264
	(0.308)	(0.333)	(0.322)	(0.192)
Migration background				
1, 1st generation	-0.224	0.126	-0.123	-0.038
	(0.254)	(0.275)	(0.266)	(0.158)
2, 2nd generation	-0.532**	0.336	-0.175	-0.302**
	(0.226)	(0.245)	(0.237)	(0.141)
Political orientation				
2, Centre-Left	-0.510***	0.553***	-0.625***	-0.453***
	(0.155)	(0.168)	(0.162)	(0.097)
3, Centre-Right	-0.839***	0.859***	-0.992***	-0.610***
	(0.163)	(0.176)	(0.170)	(0.101)
4, Right	-0.708***	0.972***	-0.810***	-0.657***
	(0.158)	(0.171)	(0.165)	(0.098)
5, Missing	-0.390**	0.500***	-0.796***	-0.529***
	(0.173)	(0.187)	(0.181)	(0.108)
Regions				
2, North East	0.178	-0.144	0.174	0.082
	(0.153)	(0.166)	(0.160)	(0.095)
3, Center	0.280*	-0.262	0.166	0.095
	(0.152)	(0.165)	(0.159)	(0.095)
4, South and Islands	0.026	-0.247*	-0.096	-0.087
	(0.138)	(0.149)	(0.144)	(0.086)
Constant	6.960***	4.561***	7.052***	4.227***
	(0.318)	(0.345)	(0.333)	(0.199)
Observations	1,932	1,932	1,932	1,932
R-squared	0.052	0.051	0.058	0.064

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE A. 3B OVER-ESTIMATORS IS A REFERENCE CATEGORY

VARIABLES	(1) Reduce diff. between rich and poor	(2) Inequality as a reward for talent and effort	(3) Progressive taxation	(4) Antipoverty measures
Treatment = 1, treatment	0.018	-0.205	0.252*	-0.062
	(0.136)	(0.147)	(0.142)	(0.085)
Groups by perception of distance from the PL				
1, under-estimators	-0.022	0.022	0.330*	0.082
	(0.170)	(0.184)	(0.178)	(0.106)
2, accurate perceivers(+-0.1sd)	-0.091	-0.049	0.297	0.371***
	(0.217)	(0.235)	(0.227)	(0.135)
Interaction effects				
1.treatment#1. under-estimators	-0.164	0.131	-0.547**	-0.094

	(0.230)	(0.249)	(0.241)	(0.144)
1.treatment#2.accurate perceivers	0.143	0.574*	-0.350	-0.309
	(0.312)	(0.338)	(0.327)	(0.195)
Constant	6.554***	4.702***	6.526***	4.055***
	(0.332)	(0.359)	(0.347)	(0.207)
Observations	1,931	1,931	1,931	1,931
R-squared	0.054	0.052	0.059	0.064

TABLE A. 4 FOR FIGURE 3 MISPERCEPTIONS OF THE DISTANCE FROM THE POVERTY LINE AND PREFERENCES FOR REDISTRIBUTION, OLS

VARIABLES	(1) Reduce diff. between rich and poor	(2) Inequality as a reward for talent and effort	(3) Progressive taxation	(4) Antipoverty measures
Treatment				
1, treatment	-0.03	-0.07	-0.01	-0.14**
	(0.103)	(0.112)	(0.108)	(0.065)
Misperceived distance from the poverty line (in 100 euro)	-0.00	0.00	-0.01**	-0.00
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
1.treatment#misperceived distance from the poverty line (in 100 euro)	-0.00	-0.00	0.01*	0.00
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)
Sex				
1, Woman	0.13	-0.34***	0.08	-0.17***
	(0.106)	(0.115)	(0.111)	(0.066)
Age				
2, 25-34	0.42**	-0.00	0.15	0.07
	(0.211)	(0.229)	(0.221)	(0.132)
3, 35-44	0.25	-0.02	0.50**	0.16
	(0.204)	(0.221)	(0.213)	(0.127)
4, 45-54	0.70***	0.05	0.81***	0.15
	(0.198)	(0.214)	(0.207)	(0.124)
5, 55-64	0.78***	0.06	0.96***	0.13
	(0.201)	(0.217)	(0.210)	(0.125)
6, 65-70	0.69***	0.14	1.23***	0.38**
	(0.247)	(0.268)	(0.259)	(0.154)
Education				
2, Medium	-0.11	-0.20	-0.01	0.17**
	(0.124)	(0.135)	(0.130)	(0.078)
3, High	-0.33**	0.11	-0.11	0.12
	(0.153)	(0.166)	(0.160)	(0.096)
HH size				
2, 2	0.25	0.00	0.16	-0.03
	(0.173)	(0.187)	(0.181)	(0.108)
3, 3	0.56***	-0.02	0.40**	-0.12
	(0.172)	(0.187)	(0.180)	(0.108)
4, 4	0.50***	0.28	0.38**	-0.02
	(0.182)	(0.197)	(0.190)	(0.114)
5, 5	0.41	0.31	0.06	-0.07
	(0.254)	(0.275)	(0.266)	(0.159)
6, 6 and more	-0.05	0.00	0.85**	-0.19
	(0.372)	(0.403)	(0.390)	(0.233)
Income quintiles				
2	-0.13	0.26	0.08	0.02
	(0.164)	(0.177)	(0.171)	(0.102)

3	-0.31*	0.51***	-0.09	0.11
	(0.169)	(0.183)	(0.177)	(0.105)
4	-0.03	0.35*	-0.02	0.12
	(0.180)	(0.196)	(0.189)	(0.113)
5	-0.15	0.64***	-0.01	0.20*
	(0.184)	(0.200)	(0.193)	(0.115)
Employment status				
2, Unemployed	0.26	-0.25	0.05	0.35***
	(0.181)	(0.197)	(0.190)	(0.113)
3, Inactive	0.17	0.04	0.16	0.03
	(0.140)	(0.151)	(0.146)	(0.087)
9, Other	-0.09	-0.29	0.16	-0.28
	(0.308)	(0.333)	(0.322)	(0.192)
Migration background				
1, 1st generation	-0.20	0.13	-0.11	-0.03
	(0.254)	(0.275)	(0.266)	(0.158)
2, 2nd generation	-0.51**	0.31	-0.15	-0.27*
	(0.226)	(0.245)	(0.237)	(0.141)
Political attitudes				
2, Centre-Left	-0.52***	0.56***	-0.63***	-0.45***
	(0.155)	(0.168)	(0.162)	(0.097)
3, Centre-Right	-0.84***	0.86***	-0.99***	-0.60***
	(0.162)	(0.176)	(0.170)	(0.101)
4, Right	-0.71***	0.97***	-0.81***	-0.66***
	(0.158)	(0.171)	(0.165)	(0.098)
5, Missing	-0.40**	0.50***	-0.80***	-0.54***
	(0.173)	(0.188)	(0.181)	(0.108)
Regions				
2, North East	0.18	-0.15	0.18	0.08
	(0.153)	(0.166)	(0.160)	(0.095)
3, Center	0.29*	-0.28*	0.17	0.10
	(0.152)	(0.164)	(0.159)	(0.095)
4, South and Islands	0.03	-0.25*	-0.09	-0.09
	(0.138)	(0.149)	(0.144)	(0.086)
Constant	6.94***	4.54***	6.86***	4.22***
	(0.301)	(0.326)	(0.315)	(0.188)
Observations	1,932	1,932	1,932	1,932
R-squared	0.052	0.049	0.058	0.061

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE A. 5 FOR FIGURE 4 EFFECT OF LEARNING ABOUT CROSSING PL ON PR AMONG TREATED OVER-ESTIMATORS

VARIABLES	(1) A. Reduce diff. between rich and poor	(2) B. Inequality as a reward for talent and effort	(3) C. Progressive taxation	(4) D. Antipoverty measures
Crossed PL	0.100	-0.074	0.151	-0.246
	(0.310)	(0.350)	(0.317)	(0.193)
sex = 1, Woman	0.257	-0.754***	0.375*	-0.093
	(0.206)	(0.232)	(0.211)	(0.128)
25-34	0.475	-0.131	-0.080	-0.017
	(0.396)	(0.447)	(0.406)	(0.247)
35-44	0.566	0.044	0.077	0.101
	(0.383)	(0.433)	(0.393)	(0.239)
45-54	0.838**	-0.164	0.690*	0.341
	(0.371)	(0.418)	(0.380)	(0.231)
55-64	0.982**	0.041	0.554	0.414*
	(0.385)	(0.434)	(0.394)	(0.240)

65-70	0.866*	0.275	1.023**	0.506*
	(0.484)	(0.546)	(0.495)	(0.302)
Education: Medium	0.009	-0.238	-0.036	0.478***
	(0.253)	(0.286)	(0.259)	(0.158)
Education: High	-0.374	-0.024	-0.293	0.302
	(0.310)	(0.350)	(0.318)	(0.194)
HH size = 2	0.218	0.634	0.343	0.265
	(0.426)	(0.480)	(0.436)	(0.266)
HH size = 3	0.675	0.425	0.681	0.014
	(0.426)	(0.480)	(0.436)	(0.266)
HH size = 4	0.673	0.702	0.365	0.001
	(0.437)	(0.493)	(0.448)	(0.273)
HH size = 5	0.537	0.821	0.581	0.082
	(0.551)	(0.622)	(0.565)	(0.344)
HH size = 6, and more	-0.740	0.056	1.326*	-0.075
	(0.712)	(0.803)	(0.729)	(0.444)
quantiles of inc = 2	-0.350	0.224	-0.162	0.035
	(0.313)	(0.354)	(0.321)	(0.196)
quantiles of inc = 3	-0.106	-0.017	0.058	-0.172
	(0.374)	(0.422)	(0.383)	(0.233)
quantiles of inc = 4	-0.030	0.247	-0.190	-0.041
	(0.410)	(0.463)	(0.420)	(0.256)
quantiles of inc = 5	0.064	0.584	0.174	0.141
	(0.441)	(0.498)	(0.452)	(0.275)
Unemployed	-0.084	-0.790**	-0.567	0.140
	(0.340)	(0.384)	(0.349)	(0.212)
Inactive	0.066	-0.054	-0.300	-0.032
	(0.268)	(0.303)	(0.275)	(0.167)
Other	0.507	-0.893	0.263	-0.745*
	(0.619)	(0.699)	(0.634)	(0.387)
1st generation immigrants	-0.969*	-0.305	-0.573	0.267
	(0.520)	(0.587)	(0.533)	(0.325)
2nd generation immigrants	-0.620	0.638	-0.113	-0.336
	(0.404)	(0.456)	(0.414)	(0.252)
Centre-Left	-0.900***	0.700**	-0.994***	-0.323*
	(0.299)	(0.338)	(0.307)	(0.187)
Centre-Right	-1.192***	1.093***	-0.944***	-0.684***
	(0.319)	(0.360)	(0.327)	(0.199)
Right	-0.743**	0.642*	-1.078***	-0.650***
	(0.302)	(0.341)	(0.309)	(0.188)
Missing	-0.968***	0.312	-1.225***	-0.635***
	(0.331)	(0.374)	(0.339)	(0.207)
North East	-0.098	0.280	0.061	-0.078
	(0.308)	(0.348)	(0.316)	(0.192)
Center	0.277	-0.025	0.120	0.004
	(0.300)	(0.339)	(0.308)	(0.188)
South and Islands	0.020	0.176	0.067	-0.199
	(0.273)	(0.309)	(0.280)	(0.171)
Constant	6.947***	4.251***	7.296***	3.936***
	(0.642)	(0.725)	(0.658)	(0.401)
Observations	534	534	534	534
R-squared	0.102	0.086	0.090	0.121

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE A.6 FOR FIGURE 5: EFFECT OF TREATMENT ON PREFERENCES FOR REDISTRIBUTION ACROSS INCOME QUINTILES

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)

VARIABLES	Reduce diff. between rich and poor	Inequality as a reward for talent and effort	Progressive taxation	Antipoverty measures
2	-0.858*	-0.017	-0.866*	-0.200
	(0.467)	(0.503)	(0.490)	(0.292)
3	-1.592***	-0.048	-1.385***	0.368
	(0.451)	(0.486)	(0.473)	(0.282)
4	-1.318***	0.039	-0.560	0.414
	(0.478)	(0.515)	(0.502)	(0.300)
5	-1.073***	0.303	-0.577	0.079
	(0.412)	(0.444)	(0.432)	(0.258)
Accurate perceivers(+-0.1sd)	-1.544***	-0.422	-0.356	0.422
	(0.583)	(0.628)	(0.611)	(0.365)
Over-estimators	-1.039***	-0.440	-1.555***	-0.080
	(0.384)	(0.414)	(0.403)	(0.241)
2.quintile#2.Plgr	1.353*	0.817	0.620	0.030
	(0.800)	(0.862)	(0.840)	(0.501)
2.quintile#3.Plgr	0.899*	0.288	1.388**	0.161
	(0.544)	(0.586)	(0.571)	(0.341)
3.quintile#2.Plgr	1.588**	0.780	0.417	-0.514
	(0.783)	(0.843)	(0.821)	(0.490)
3.quintile#3.Plgr	1.360**	1.015*	1.940***	-0.275
	(0.532)	(0.573)	(0.558)	(0.333)
4o.quintile#1b.Plgr	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
4.quintile#2.Plgr	1.864**	0.492	0.105	-0.217
	(0.785)	(0.846)	(0.824)	(0.492)
4.quintile#3.Plgr	1.580***	0.729	1.192**	-0.427
	(0.577)	(0.622)	(0.605)	(0.361)
5.quintile#2.Plgr	2.106***	0.095	0.290	0.122
	(0.779)	(0.840)	(0.818)	(0.488)
5.quintile#3.Plgr	1.082**	0.563	1.399**	0.129
	(0.522)	(0.562)	(0.548)	(0.327)
1, treatment	-1.101**	-0.482	-1.083**	-0.085
	(0.451)	(0.486)	(0.473)	(0.282)
2.quintile#1.treatment	0.707	0.376	1.149*	0.313
	(0.641)	(0.691)	(0.673)	(0.402)
3.quintile#1.treatment	1.366**	1.036	1.515**	-0.198
	(0.628)	(0.677)	(0.659)	(0.394)
4.quintile#1.treatment	1.599**	0.113	0.912	-0.662*
	(0.630)	(0.679)	(0.661)	(0.395)
5o.quintile#0b.treatment	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
5.quintile#1.treatment	0.766	0.824	0.190	0.109
	(0.575)	(0.619)	(0.603)	(0.360)
2.Plgr#1.treatment	2.465***	-0.291	0.720	-0.143
	(0.949)	(1.023)	(0.996)	(0.595)
3.Plgr#1.treatment	1.149**	0.444	1.789***	-0.133
	(0.540)	(0.582)	(0.567)	(0.339)
2.quintile#2.Plgr#1.treatment	-1.754	0.454	-0.651	-0.350
	(1.223)	(1.318)	(1.283)	(0.766)
2.quintile#3.Plgr#1.treatment	-1.020	-0.376	-1.794**	-0.120
	(0.762)	(0.821)	(0.800)	(0.477)
3.quintile#2.Plgr#1.treatment	-2.013*	0.235	-0.704	0.106
	(1.192)	(1.284)	(1.250)	(0.747)
3.quintile#3.Plgr#1.treatment	-1.081	-1.887**	-1.903**	0.335
	(0.755)	(0.814)	(0.793)	(0.473)
4.quintile#2.Plgr#1.treatment	-3.093**	1.304	-0.725	0.564
	(1.222)	(1.317)	(1.283)	(0.766)
4o.quintile#3o.Plgr#0b.treatment	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)

4.quintile#3.Plgr#1.treatment	-1.527**	-0.429	-1.400*	1.109**
	(0.768)	(0.827)	(0.806)	(0.481)
5.quintile#2.Plgr#1.treatment	-2.961**	0.583	-0.159	-0.473
	(1.190)	(1.282)	(1.249)	(0.746)
5o.quintile#3o.Plgr#0b.treatment	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
5.quintile#3.Plgr#1.treatment	-0.543	-0.791	-0.591	0.264
	(0.739)	(0.797)	(0.776)	(0.463)
Constant	8.271***	5.104***	8.083***	3.896***
	(0.327)	(0.352)	(0.343)	(0.205)
Observations	1,932	1,932	1,932	1,932
R-squared	0.018	0.025	0.019	0.021

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1